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JURISDICTION 
Section 78-31a-19, Utah Code (1985 Amendment), and Rule 
3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, confer upon this Court 
jurisdiction to the hear the appeal of Claron Bailey the trial 
from the trials court's judgment awarding Bailey $1,800.00 by 
virtue of Call's failure to provide a bond as required by former 
Section 14-2-1, et seq., Utah Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is there sufficient evidence to support the trial 
court's factual finding that the property owner Call did not 
confer any authority upon the original supplier which would allow 
Bailey to claim the lien interest under the mechanic's lien law? 
2. Is a mechanic's lien filed by Bailey valid against 
the owner of real property who did not give authority to the 
original supplier to obtain supplies from any other source? 
3. Does the language of the former Utah bond law limit 
the judgment to "the price as agreed upon" between the owner and 
the original supplier? 
4. Has Bailey waived his right to contest the amount of 
the judgment awarded by the trial court? 
5. Did the trial court abuse its' discretion in not 
awarding the appellant any attorneys fees? 
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APPLICABLE STATUTES & RULES 
1. Mechanic's Liens Statutes. 
Utah Code Section 38-1-3. Those entitled to lien -
What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors and al|L persons performing 
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment 
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner 
and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have 
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning 
which they have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished 
or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service 
tendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or 
rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner 
or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such 
interest as the owner may have in the property. 
Utah Code Section 38-1-17. Cost -» Apportionment -
Costs and attorneys' fee to subcontractor. 
As between the owner and the contractor the court shall 
apportion the costs according to the right of the case, but in all 
cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs 
awarded to him, including the costs of preparing and recording the 
notice of claim of lien and such reasonable attorney's fee as may 
be incurred in preparing and recording said notice of claim of 
lien. 
Utah Code Section 38-1-18. Attorneys' fee. 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall 
be taxed as costs in the action. 
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2. Bond Law Statutes. 
Utah Code Section 14-2-2 (former statute, prior to 1987 
revision). Failure to require bond — Direct liability — 
Limitation of actions. 
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who 
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit 
the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all 
persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the 
contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or 
labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices 
agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be 
commenced within one year from the last date the last materials 
were furnished or the labor performed. 
3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(a). Findings by the court. 
Effect. 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injuctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary 
for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided 
in Rule 4Kb). The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is 
based on more than one ground. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Claron Bailey, the plaintiff/appellant, brought this action 
in Salt Lake Fifth Circuit Court to foreclose a mechanic's lien he 
had filed against the property owned by the defendants/respond-
ents, William G. Call and Gene S. Call, his wife. The plaintiff 
brought this action against Mr. and Mrs. Call, who are the title 
owners of the property, although Mr. Call was the only one who had 
any material conversation or dealings relevant to this matter. 
Bailey had supplied material used in the repair of a commercial 
building owned by the Calls. Mr. Call had contracted with a 
LeRoy Gurule to supply the materials from Gurule's own warehouse. 
Thereafter Gurule, without Call's knowledge, obtained the 
materials from Bailey. 
After two days of trial (separated by several weeks due 
do to the trial court's calendar), judgment was granted in favor 
of Bailey. The trial court applied the Ut^h bond laws in granting 
judgment, and not the mechanic's liens laws. The judgment was not 
prepared by plaintiff's counsel and entered in the court records 
for more than one year after the trial court announced its 
findings and conclusions. Bailey seeks to appeal the trial court's 
judgment as inadequate, as insufficiently s^upported by evidence and 
as inappropriately applying the bond law instead of the mechanic's 
lien law. 
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Statement of Facts 
In April 1985 Mr. Call had a conversation with a 
customer in his store about ceiling repairs that were necessary 
because of heavy snow fall the previous winter. The customer, 
LeRoy Gurule (spelled Gurle by the reporter in the record) 
represented to Mr. Call that he was in the construction business 
and that he could provide all the supplies needed by Call in 
making the needed repairs. Call became more interested when 
Gurule represented that he bought materials by the truckload 
direct from the manufacturer and could supply materials at a 
favorable price. Accordingly, Gurule was commissioned to supply 
the material from his own supply located in his own warehouses. 
(Record 348-351). 
Mr. Call had hired another contractor to perform the 
labor, although Gurule's son was hired at Gurule's request to 
assist in the work (R. 349, 180, 335). Unbeknownst to Call, Gurule 
contacted Claron Bailey, also a supplier of the necessary 
material, to arrange delivery of the needed material to Call's 
store (R. 352, 224-225). The material was delivered from Bailey's 
warehouse to the jobsite by two individuals, Mr. Bailey's brother 
and Gurule's son (R. 175, 182; Exhibits P-l, P-2, P-3, P-5 to 
P-8, P-10). Mr. Call testified that he did not know the source of 
these materials was Mr. Bailey until after the last delivery on 
May 21, 1985. Mr. Call stated that between the date of the last 
delivery and the date the mechanic's lien was filed, May 31, 1985, 
he had a telephone conversation with Mr. Bailey, (R. 351-352). 
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Although there is conflicting evidence as tp whether or not this 
conversation ocurred before or after the la$t delivery, Mr. Bailey 
admitted that neither he nor anyone at his direction contacted Mr. 
Call prior to the first shipment of material (R. 223). It should 
be pointed out that the trial judge evidently believed plaintiff's 
testimony as reflected in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the trial 
court's Findings of Fact (R. 371-372, see also the addendum). 
Some of the material supplied by Bailey was returned to 
Bailey by Teddy Gurule, for credit (R. 195). There is also 
testimony that some of the materials apparently delivered to the 
jobsite were not used in the job (R. 193, $ee also Exhibits P-6 
and P-12). 
The last material supplied by Bailey was delivered to 
Call's buiding on May 21, 1985, and the mechanic's lien was signed 
by plaintiff and filed on May 31, 1985 (Exhibits P.3 and P.14). 
The lien claimed the sum of $3,435.17, together with interest due 
thereon. There was no agreement by Call as to the amount of 
interest to accrue. The complaint filed by Bailey sought damages 
in the amount of $3,435.17, together with interest. At trial 
plaintiff's bookkeeper admitted that the amount stated in the lien 
was incorrect (R. 170). Call refused to make payment to Bailey, 
having paid Gurule at least $2,000 and perhaps $2,200 (R. 201, 
352). Trial followed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Trial produced sufficient evidence which showed that 
Call had not authorized Gurule to purchase materials from anyone 
else, including Bailey. Therefore, the trial court's findings of 
fact on this issue are beyond reproof. 
2. The mechanic's lien law is limited to labor and 
supplies provided for the property with the owner's knowledge and 
consent. Since Gurule had no authority to obtain supplies from 
Bailey, the trial court properly concluded that recovery under the 
mechanic's lien law was not available to Bailey. 
3. The former bond law provision applicable to Call's 
construction required the trial court to award less than the 
reasonable value of the materials because Call had agreed with 
Gurule on a lesser amount. 
4. The $1,800.00 judgment amount was not raised by 
Bailey in the trial court and thus cannot be considered for the 
first time on appeal. In any event, the evidence and the law 
supports an award of less than the amount agreed to by Call. 
5. The trial court's exercise of discretion in 
determining the equities of Bailey's claim for attorney's fees was 
proper. And since Bailey has pursued a frivolous appeal on issues 
well settled, Call should be awarded his attorney's fees 
necessitated by Bailey's appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT GURULE DID NOT HAVE 
AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN THE SUPPLIES FROM BAILEY 
Bailey suggests this court disregard the trial courtfs 
Findings of Fact relative to Gurule's lack of authority to order 
materials from Bailey. Bailey suggests that it is Mr. Call's 
testimony alone which supports paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the 
trial courts Findings of Fact, yet by that suggestion, Bailey 
concedes that there is evidence to support the trial court's 
findings. The standard of review in this situation is set forth 
in the January 1, 1987, amendment to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which deals with findings of fact and conclus-
ions of law entered by a trial court in a non-jury proceeding. 
See also Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d 464 (Utah, 1987). Rule 52(a) 
provides, in part: 
. . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erronous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. . . . 
The following excerpt from Mr. Call's testimony 
illustrates Mr. Call's understanding with Gurule: 
Q: Did Mr. Gurle [sic] make any statements to you about 
where he was going to get his material, other than the one you — 
the statement you already described? 
A: Well, he said he supplied all his own. He brought it 
in by the truckload and he — that's — and he warehouses it here. 
Q: Did he ever — 
A: He represented himself as a big contractor. 
Q: Did he ever tell you that hi$ — any of this material 
would be supplied locally? 
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A: No. Absolutely not. 
Q: Did you give him any authority to purchase any 
material locally? 
A: No. (R. 351). 
Mr. Call had testified earlier that he contracted with 
Gurule only to provide the materials, and that he had contracted 
with another to provide the labor (R. 199, 349). However, Mr. 
Gurule's son did assist in some of the labor to install the 
sheetrock and Mr. Gurule himself physically assisted the work on 
one occasion (R. 192). 
Appellant's brief also fixes upon the testimony of one of 
the workers that Call hired to work on the ceiling to support the 
notion that Call knew that the materials came from Bailey's 
warehouse. However, the witness (Clarey Haulk) testified that it 
"was in May, sometime" when he learned the supplier was Claron 
Bailey (R. 336). This could easily have been between May 21 and 
May 31, when Mr. Call himself found out the supplier was Claron 
Bailey. In is interesting to note that Teddy Gurule, LeRoy's son, 
was called by Bailey as a rebuttal witness. In his testimony on 
rebuttal, young Mr. Gurule testified that Mr. Haulk hauled away 
some of the materials, presumably for his own personal use (R. 361). 
Undoubtedly this may have had a damaging effect on Mr. Haulk's 
credibility in certain matters, a factor which is of course the 
trial court's sole province to determine. 
It is perhaps most significant that the appellant's own 
witnesses failed to establish any knowledge on Mr. Call's behalf 
that the materials had been supplied by Bailey prior to their 
delivery. As noted in the statement of facts, there is some 
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disputed evidence on this point, but even so it remains clear that 
no one on behalf of Mr. Bailey ever had any contact with Mr. Call 
or his wife prior to the first delivery of the subject supplies. 
There is, therefore, no overwhelming contrary evidence that the 
agreement between Mr. Call and Roy Gurule was anything other than 
that stated by Mr. Call, nor is there any overwhelming evidence 
that Mr. Call knew of the source of the supplies until after they 
had been delivered and installed in his building. Thus, the trial 
court's finding that LeRoy Gurule did not have the authority to 
purchase materials for Mr. Call from Mr. Bailey is a finding of 
fact that is well within the trial court's discretion to make. 
II. 
BAILEY CANNOT RECOVER AGAINST CALL UNDER 
THE MECHANIC'S LIEN LAW BECAUSE GURULE WAS 
NOT ACTING WITH CALL'S AUTHORITY 
Appellant's brief next challenge is to the trial court's 
conclusion that since Mr. Gurule had no authority to obtain 
materials from Bailey, Bailey cannot maintain a claim under the 
mechanic's lien law for the value of the material so supplied. 
In support of his position urging this court to hold that 
the mechanic's lien law will presume agency under any 
circumstance, the appellant's brief cites Interiors Contracting, 
Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 (Utah, 1982). In Navalco, the 
lessee (Green Acres) had leased the property from the owner 
(Navalco) and sublet a portion of the building to the sub-lessee 
(Hungry Hawaiian). In approving the sub-lease, Navalco had given 
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its approval for alterations necessary for the Hungry Hawaiian to 
commence restaurant operations. The subcontractors hired to make 
the necessary modifications did not receive full payment for their 
labor and materials and both filed a notice of lien on the building, 
which included claims against the sub-lessee, the lessee and the 
owner. 
The Supreme Court reversed summary judgment in favor of 
the lessee and sub-lessee, but with respect to the judgment 
entered against the owner, the court reversed that judgment with 
the following analysis: 
As to the argument that Navalco authorized 
the improvements by a letter of acceptance, 
which was signed by Navalco January 31, 1978, we 
are of the view that the acceptance amounted to 
no more than its consent that the alterations be 
made. The record shows no more than Navalco's 
knowledge of and acquiescence in the making of 
the improvements by Hungry Hawaiian. Navalco's 
knowledge and acquiescence in the making of the 
improvements is not sufficient to charge the fee 
owner's interest with a mechanic's lien, see 
Zion's First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 
2.d 395, 464 P.2 387 (1970), especially since 
Navalco was a remote lessor and the master lease 
between Navalco and Green Acres did not 
contemplate that the premises were to be used as 
a restaurant. Therefore, the judgment against 
Navalco, was the exception of the $582.00 [for 
work done after Navalco expressly authorized one 
of the claimants to finish certain work], must 
be reversed. 648 P.2d, at 1390 (other citations 
omitted). 
The effect of this reasoning is directly contrary to 
Bailey's position. Such is the reasoning applied by the trial 
court to this case. The owner William Call had absolutely no 
knowledge that Bailey was supplying the materials until after they 
had been supplied and a portion used in his building, directly 
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contrary to Call's understanding with Gurul^. Thus Call cannot be 
charged with a claim under the mechanic's lien statute by virtue of 
Mr. Gurule's total lack of authority to order material from 
Bailey, and Call's lack of knowledge as to the source of the 
material. 
The supreme court's holding in Navalco is also directly 
contrary to the Massachusetts case cited in appellant's brief, 
Viccory v. Richardson, 75 N.E. 136 (Mass., 1905). Thus, this case 
is impersuasive and has no application to the present situation. 
Bailey also cites Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2nd 422, 424 
P.2d 446 (1976), in support of his position. However, in Frehner 
the defendant owner not only knew of the plaintiff architect's 
involvement in landscaping the subject property, the defendant 
owner gave his express permission to his daughter to continue 
using the plaintiff architect. Thus, the supreme court concluded: 
. . . These facts provide a reasonable basis for 
the conclusions that the daughter, Margaret, was 
authorized by the defendants to engage the 
plaintiff to do the landscaping; that it was 
done with the defendants' knowledge; and that, 
therefore, under the statute their interest in 
the property was liable for the improvement thus 
conferred upon it. 424 p.2d, at 447. 
Again, in comparing the facts and holding in Frehner to 
the instant case, the defendant owners in Frehner were held liable 
because they knew and authorized the involvement of the lien 
claimant. In McCombs Construction, Inc., v. Barnes 645 P.2d 1131 
(Wash. App., 1982),Frehner v. Morton, supra, was cited by the lien 
claimant in an action against the owners of a home who had allowed 
their son to live in the home. The son had directed certain 
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modifications be made to the home without the parents prior 
knowledge or approval. Although the parents visited the home 
during construction and knew of the construction, the Washington 
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that Frehner v. Morton was 
applicable. The court held that statutory agency under the 
Washington statutory scheme was inappropriate because: 
. Although contractors, subcontractors and 
architects have the authority to incur an indeb-
tness which may result in the attachment of a 
lien on the owner's property, this authority may 
arise only wherethe owner has given it to them. 
645 P.2 at 1134. 
Such an analysis is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court decision in Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, supra. 
Appellant's brief also cites Metals Manufacturing Co. 
v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2.d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964), a case 
cited in Navalco. This case offers no comfort to Bailey for two 
reasons. First, the property owner was not involved in the claim 
or the litigation. Second, the defendant lessee bank knew in 
advance the contractor obtained certain specific material from a 
supplier. The supreme court held that the intention and knowledge 
of the parties properly resulted in a valid bond claim (the bank 
had failed to obtain a bond under the statute relevant here) 
against the bank. 
Bailey argues that because it is customary for suppliers 
to rely on the representations of those who order material, 
such reliance can ignore the authority of those persons who order 
the materials in making lien claims. Bailey's brief alleges that 
such is the customary course of business dealings between 
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contractors and suppliers. There was no evidence presented to the 
trial court to support itr but even assuming that such a course of 
dealing is customary, the custom cannot overcome the doctrine of 
express and apparent authority. Bailey testified that he solely 
relied upon the representations of Gurule ifl delivering the 
material to Call's building and that he did not know whether Call 
was aware of where the materials were coming from (R. 226, 227). 
Thus, Bailey argues that because it is customary for him to do 
so, he has no duty to make any determination that the potential 
lien defendant knows who the potential lien claimants could be. 
Such a carte blanche interpretation of the Mechanic's lien statutue 
is totally inappropriate and totally ignore|s the language of the 
legislature which specifically requires an owner or an agent of 
the owner, having proper authority, to agree to the supply of 
materials or labor. 
The appellant's argued interpretation of the mechanic's 
lien statute would lead to liens being fil^d in the most extreme 
of circumstances, such as where an owner of property gives his 
consent to a contractor to install carpeting that turns out to be 
stolen from a supplier. If the contractor had represented to the 
owner that he already owned the carpet, Barley's interpretation of 
the mechanic's lien law would nontheless permit the supplier to 
file a lien against the owner's home. The law governing agents 
and their authority must be given more thafi lip service in an 
interpretation of the mechanic's lien statute. 
Bailey also argues that by agreeing to have the work done 
in the first place, Call made Gurule his authority to obtain 
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materials from anyone. The cited reasoning is Interiors Contracting, 
Inc. v. Navalcp/ supra, suggests otherwise. It is hornbook law 
that the existence of apparent authority hinges upon the conduct 
of the principal. Apparent authority has been defined as "that 
which, though not actually granted, the principal knowingly 
permits the agent to exercise or which he holds him out as posses-
sing." Thus, the basis of an agent's apparent authority: 
. . results from statements, conduct, lack of 
ordinary care, or manifestation of the principal 
consent, whereby third persons are justified in 
believing that the agent is acting within his 
authority. 3 Am Jur 2.nd, Agency, Section 74, p. 
476. 
In Roby's Enterprises, Inc. v. Hanover Development Corp., 
679 P.2d 871 (Ore.App., 1984), the Oregon Court of Appeals 
addressed, inter alia, a similar agency issue. In that case the 
contractor's construction superintendant had hired the lien 
claimant to effect floor repairs. In setting aside summary 
judgment against the contractor, the appeals court noted that 
affidavits submitted by the contractor (Douglas) indicated that 
the superintendant (Olson) did not have authority to hire the lien 
claimant. The court concluded: 
Although there is no dispute that Olson 
was Douglas1 agent on the project, a principal 
cannot be held liable for the acts of its agent 
unless the acts are within the scope of the 
agents real or apparent authority. 679 P.2d, at 
874 (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, the case was sent back for trial on that 
issue, among others. 
By Bailey's own admission, Gurule did nothing other than 
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misrepresent that he had Call's authority to order the material. 
Bailey cannot claim Gurule had apparent authority when Bailey had 
not talked to Mr. Call until after the material had been supplied. 
The trial court thus properly concluded that because 
Gurule had no authority, express, implied or apparent, to order 
materials from Bailey, and because Call didn't know their source, 
Bailey cannot recover against Call under the Utah mechanic's lien 
statute which requires such authority. 
III. 
THE AMOUNT AWARDED BAILEY COMPLIED WITH THE 
FORMER UTAH BOND LAW AND WAS PROPER IN THAT IT 
DID NOT EXCEED THE PRICE AS AGREED UPON BY CALL 
Because Call failed to obtain a bond under the Utah bond law 
and because the bond law makes no reference to agents with or 
without authority, the trial court applied the bond law statute 
in awarding Bailey judgment against Call. Bailey complains that 
the amount of the judgment is not the reasonable value of the 
material he supplied, but, is the price agreed upon by Gurule and 
Call. 
In comparing the bond and lien statutues, the language used 
with regard to the amount which can be claimed by a lien claimant 
in Section 14-2-2, is obviously different than the amount which 
can be awarded a lien claimant in Section 38-1-3. The mechanic's 
lien law refers to the "value of the material or labor furnished" 
and is not limited by the language "not exceeding, however, in 
any case the prices agreed upon," contained in former Section 14-2-2. 
It would seem logical that the "prices agreed upon" by Call, the 
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owner, is the price that governs since he is the one who agreed 
to have the work done in the first place. Further, Bailey cannot 
escape the logic that since the trial court found there was no 
expressf apparent or implied authority for Gurule to obtain 
material from Bailey, as the lien statute requires, Gurule had no 
authority to agree upon a price which would be binding upon Call. 
It is noteworthy that in its 1987 session, the Utah legislature 
rewrote Section 14-2-2 to remove the limitation and made it easier 
for persons in Bailey's position to claim "reasonable value". But 
this amendment of course does not apply to the present case. 
Bailey cites the need for suppliers to recover their 
profits which would give him judgment for the amount denied him under 
the mechanic's lien statute. It makes no sense to misinterpret the 
clear language of the former bond law and allow Bailey to get through 
the back door what he couldn't get through the front door, particu-
larly since he took absolutely no precautions to determine the extent 
of Gurule's authority before shipping materials for Gurule. While 
the new Section 14-2-2 renders Bailey's policy arguments moot, it 
would not have hindered commerce between contractors, laborers, 
suppliers and owners in this state one bit for suppliers and 
laborers to make sure that potential lien defendants know who the 
potential lien claimants are, particularly when the suppliers and 
laborers have the knowledge to do so, whereas the owners do not. 
If suppliers failed in this duty, then under the mechanic's lien 
laws they were limited to claims under the former bond law, which 
may have deprived them of their profit but still gave them some 
measure of protection. Since the legislature has conformed the 
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language of Section 14-2-2 to Section 38-1-3, they apparently were 
of a similar frame of mind as Bailey. But since the law doesn't 
affect earlier contracts, this Court must ^pply the old law, 
IV. 
THE AWARD BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE AMOUNT 
$1,800.00 WAS PROPER AND BEYOND ATTACK 
In considering the amount of the trial court's award, 
two factors are initially important. 
First, although trial was concluded on May 16, 1986, and 
the court announced it's findings and conclusions on that day, the 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law a^ id the Judgment were not 
entered for nearly one year, on April 29, 1987. 
Second, during that interim period Bailey filed a motion 
for amendment of judgment or new trial on May 27, 1986. The 
motion is silent as to the amount awarded by the trial court (R. 
70-73). Bailey's motion was denied, following argument before the 
court, on September 8, 1986, (R. 97, 98). Bailey's counsel 
submitted proposed findings and a judgment in November 1986, and 
counsel exchanged correspondence as to the sufficiency of the 
proposed document. In February 1987, Bailey's counsel again sub-
mitted to counsel a proposed set of findings and a judgment. 
Respondent's counsel notified appellant's counsel that the 
proposed findings and judgment of February 1987, were insufficient 
and notified the court in the event such proposed documents were 
submitted for the courts signature that counsel intended to object 
(R. 102). Bailey's counsel noticed a hearing before the trial 
court which was eventually heard on April 29, 1987. At the time 
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the court heard arguments, counsel finally agreed on the form 
of Findings and Judgment/ which were then submitted to the court 
for it's signature. In none of these exchanges and hearings was 
the amount awarded by the trial court raised as an issue. Perhaps 
because Bailey filed a motion to amend the judgment or for a new 
trial before Findings and the Judgment were entered, this delayed 
the entry of the actual Findings, conclusions and the Judgment. 
In addition, the inordinate delay may have created some difficulty 
in attempting to precisely set forth the courts ruling from the 
bench on May 16, 1986. 
These circumstances however, do not excuse Bailey from 
his obligation, pursuant to Rule 59(b), U.R.C.P. to move for a new 
trial or amendment under Rule 59(e) within ten (10) days after 
entry of the judgment. No such motions were filed between April 
29, 1987, and May 11, 1987, the date the ten days would have 
elapsed. Nor is Bailey excused from filing a motion for relief 
from judgment or bringing an independent action pursuant to 
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. The time period for such motions would have 
expired on July 29, 1987. Having not raised the issue in the 
trial court, Bailey is precluded from raising the issue 
upon appeal, e.g. Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734 (Utah, 1985). 
In the event this court is inclined to entertain the 
merits of such a motion, it must be kept firmly in mind that there 
was a variety of conflicting evidence presented to the trial court 
as to exactly how much material supplied by Bailey was used in the 
modifications to Call's building. 
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For example, Teddy Gurule admitted he returned items for 
credit to Capitol Builders Supply (R. 115). Bailey's bookkeeper 
admitted this amounted to a $159.73 credit (R. 138). The 
bookkeeper then testified that there was an additional credit for 
materials returned (R. 139-140, see also Exhibit P-17). Further, 
Teddy Gurule stated during rebuttal testimony that Clarey Haulk 
took some of the material for his own personal use (R. 361). 
Teddy Gurule also admitted that of the 12 sheets of sheetrock 
delivered to the jobsite, only half were u3ed in the ceiling 
repair (R. 193). 
Certainly, it was within the sound discretion of the 
trial court to take into account the value of these materials that 
were taken, returned for credit, or unused* in awarding Bailey 
damages. The wording of the former bond liw statute seems to 
grant the trial court this discretion. 
V, 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO AWARD PLAINTIFF'S 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS PROPER 
The appellant seeks to have this bourt award Bailey 
attorney's fees, not only for the trial but for this appeal, 
despite the trial court's refusal to award Bailey attorney's fees. 
One of the issues addressed in Frtehner v. Morton, supra, 
dealt with the discretion of the trial court to award attorney's 
fees in such cases. In Frehner, a jury awarded the plaintiff $750 
in attorney's fees. The court reduced the attorney's fees to one-
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half of the total amount covered by the lien. The plaintiff's 
cross-appealed and asked the Utah Supreme Court to reinstate the 
original fee determined by the jury. After noting that the deter-
mination of attorney's fees in a mechanic's lien case is a 
question of equity, the court summarily ruled against the 
plaintiffs: 
We, therefore, dismiss the plaintiffs' 
cross appeal as being without merit, even 
assuming that they are entitled to a lien. If 
they are not entitled to a lien, they would not 
be entitled to an attorney's fee even though one 
or more of the defendants might be liable for 
the value of the work done.424 P.2d 446, at 448. 
Thus the supreme court refused to disturb the trial judge's 
exercise of discretion in balancing the equities to make a 
determination of attorney's fees. 
Given the trial court's finding that Gurule had no 
authority to bind Call in the purchase of material from Bailey, 
and in light of the reduced amount awarded Bailey pursuant to the 
bond lien law, it was well within the trial court's discretion to 
refuse to award plaintiff any attorney's fees. That equitable 
finding should remain undisturbed. 
On the other hand, in the event this court affirms the 
trial court's judgment, Call should be awarded his reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in defending the trial court's judgment. 
As demonstrated herein, the trial court had ample evidence to 
support its findings of fact. The conclusion of law determining 
that Bailey was not entitled to a judgment under the mechanic's 
lien statute is well supported by case law. Bailey's appeal would 
therefore appear to be frivolous, particularly considering the 
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amounts involved. Call has been required tb retain counsel 
further to defend this appeal and it is likely that those 
attorney's fees will amount to more than the difference between 
the trial court's judgment and the amount Bailey is seeking. 
Thus, Call will incur an actual out-of-pocket loss in excess of 
the amount claimed by Bailey. To impose such an economic result 
upon Call by virtue of this frivolous appeal should not go without 
some effort by this court to balance the equities. This court 
has the authority to do so by virtue of Ru][e 33, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Ample evidence supports the trial court's finding that 
LeRoy Gurule was not authorized, either apparently, impliably or 
expressly, by the respondent William Call to purchase material from 
the appellant Claron Bailey. The trial court's conclusion that 
such evidence therefore deprives Bailey of a mechanic's lien claim 
is well supported by the law. The amount awarded by the trial 
court is proper pursuant to statute and the $1,800 award itself 
has not been challenged properly by the appellant. The respond-
ents respectively urge the court to affirm the trial court's 
judgment and to award the respondents their reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred as a result of Bailey's appeal. 
DATED this ^ day of December, 1987. 
f. CALL, 
>rney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed this 
December, 1987 to: 
Steven F. Alder 
Attorney for Appellant 
220 East 3900 South, #16 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
day of 
^#<^ 
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FEB 2 ? 1981 Sfteven F. Alder, #33 Attorney for Plaintiff 
220 S. 3900 S., Suite 16 
S.L.C., UT 84107 
Telephone: 262-2500 
'. ];::'. r:;rrr.v-T 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE Of.4H?TAH- fj-p^oricMT'" 
FILED 
r • • «-*. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
CLARON D. BAILEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM G. CALL and GENE S. 
CALL, 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 85-QV-10254 
Defendants. 
) 
The foregoing matter, having come on for;crial before the 
Honorable Michael Hutchings on the ££~ d^y of f^j/r-^iAi 
£^ 1986, and subsequently on the /£> day 
^ a w J Llrgi — — i-T-
Ma 
ctAM 
± 
tagp •~~, 1986, plaintiff 
being present and represented by counsel Steven F. Alder, 
defendant VJilliam G. Call being present and (represented by counsel 
John W% Call. The court having heard evidence and argument of 
counsel; 
NOV? THEREFORE THE COURT ENTERS THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENT: 
1. The plaintiff Claron D. Bailey is granted judgment on the 
Second Cause of Action (Bond Claim) against the defendants William 
G. Call and Gene S. Call, in the sum of One Thousand Eight Hundred 
Dollars ($1800.00) together v/ith costs and Interest on that amount 
-2-
at 10% per annum from the date of delivery of the goods until the c**£s c/fa-
entry of judgment and at 12% per annum tke^eafter^Zt -c*v^ » ^Su^U****-^. 
2. The defendants First Cause of Action seeking foreclosure v ^ 
of lien is dismissed with prejudice. \ 
3. No attorney's fees are av;arded in this action to either 
I party. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
BY/ THE gOURT.V^: 
Approved by: 
Fudge Mi£hae~j 
Circuit- Court.. Jti4We 
0*Y 
John VI. Call 
Attorney for Defendant 
FEB z 7 mi 
Steven F. Alder, #33 
Attorney for Plaintiff f(l E3 
220 E. 3900 S., Suite 16 
S.L.C., UT 84107 [1 V^ ?r) i ' "• 
Telephone: 262-2500 
p- rtv V " ,( \ ' ";. : 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTArf^ V|\^ »;';-V.,,;Vi 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
CLARON D. BAILEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM G. CALL and GENS S, 
CALL
 f 
Defendants. 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS 07 LAW 
Civil Nq./ 85-CV-10254 
The foregoing matter, having come on (f:or trial before the 
Honorable Michael Hutchings on the <^ 5~ day of &P**+y ***f lb ^ ^ 1J 
1986, plaintiff being present and represented by counsel Steven F. 
Alder, defendant William G. Call being present and represented by 
counsel John V7. Call. The defendant Gene S. Call was served but 
not present was represented by John W. Call $nd bound by the 
proceedings by stipulation of counsel. The <fcourt having heard 
evidence and argument of counsel; 
NOV? THEREFORE makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendants William G. Call and G|ene S. Call are the 
owners of real property in Salt Lake County, ^tate of Utah which 
is described as follows: 
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PARCEL NO. 1: 
BEGINNING at the Southeast corner of Lot 4, 
SOUTHGATE PARK SUBDIVISION and running thence 
North 0°01f West 134.29 feet to the point of 
beginning, and running thence West 83 feet; 
thence North 0°01f East 31.55 feet; thence East 
83 feet; thence South 21.55 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
PARCEL NO. 2: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 248, 
SOUTHGATE PARK SUBDIVISION, and running thence 
South 0°01f West 71.8 feet; thence West 83 
feet; thence North 0°1' East 71.8 feet; thence 
East 83 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. The plaintiff is doing business in Salt Lake County as a 
supplier of drywall materials. 
3. The subject matter of this action included the foreclosure 
of a lien against the above-described property and therefore, this 
court has proper jurisdiction of the subject matter of this 
dispute. 
4. While the defendants were owners of the above-described 
property, they entered into a contract with a Mr. Roy Gurule for 
the construction of certain improvements upon the above-described 
real property. The improvements included: 
a) the placement of sheetrock over damaged portions of 
the ceiling; 
b) the hanging of a suspended grid ceiling and the 
placement of the ceiling tiles within the grid; 
c) the suspension and placement of fluorescent light 
panels within the grids. 
-3-
5. On or about the 26th of April, 1985, the plaintiff was 
contacted by Mr. Roy Gurule and agreed to sell to Mr. Roy Gurule 
certain materials, including the following: 
a) sheetrock 
b) sheetrock mud 
c) suspended ceiling grid and tiles 
d) lighting panels. 
6. The materials purchased by Mr. Roy Guifule from the 
plaintiff were identified by Mr.Gurule or his agents as being 
purchased for the improvement of the defendants1 property. 
7. The agreement between the plaintiff aijid Mr. Gurule 
provided that the plaintiff would receive payment for these 
materials within thirty days of delivery. 
8. The plaintiff pursuant to said agreement did provide 
materials to Mr. Roy Gurule which were delivered to the 
defendant's address or picked up by Mr. Gurul^ from the plaintiff. 
9. All materials purchased except some items returned for 
credit were installed in the real property owped by the 
defendants. 
10. Materials were supplied commencing o|n the 26th day of 
April, 1985 and continuing until the 21st day of May, 1985. 
11. The reasonable and fair market valuq of the materials 
sold to Mr. Gurule and installed as improvements to the real 
property less credits for items returned was the sum of $3,327.00. 
12. Mr. Roy Gurule failed to make payments on his account to 
the plaintiff despite demands by the plaintiff that he do so. 
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13. Plaintiff made demand for payment upon the defendants and 
the defendants have failed to make payment to the plaintiff 
against the amount owing for materials purchased. 
14. On June 7, 1985, the plaintiff caused to be recorded a 
Notice of Lien against the above-described real property as Entry 
No. 4096078 at Book 5661, Page 575, at the offices of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder. 
15. Said Notice of Lien was filed in compliance with the 
provisions and requirements of §38-1-7 et seq. U.CA. as amended. 
16. A copy of said Notice'of Lien was mailed by certified 
mail to the defendants V7illiam G. Call and Gene S. Call at 2157 
East 7050 South, Salt Lake City, Utah within thirty days of the 
recording of the lien. 
17. The lien was properly signed and notarized and otherwise 
complied in form with the statutory requirements to claim a lien 
for improvements to real property. The lien was not compromised 
or satisfied and no other action was pending to foreclose said 
lien against the real property. The plaintiff retained counsel 
for purposes of bringing this action and foreclosing its lien 
rights against the real property. 
18. The contractor's son, together with the contractor, did 
provide services at the defendants' property specifically as 
follows: the contractor's son placed sheetrock over damagedarea 
in the roof of the building and the contractor assisted in the 
loading and stacking of materials at the defendants' building. 
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19. The materials supplied by the plaintiff to the 
defendants' building were either picked up by the contractor from 
the plaintiff's business or were delivered to the defendants' 
property by a third party supplier. 
20. The contractor identified the materials purchased as 
being for the defendants' business property aiid invoices were 
marked with that identification. 
21. All charges by the contractor (Gurul^) for the job so 
identified were separately accounted for by tjie plaintiff. 
22. The contractor, Roy Gurule, at the time of the initial 
agreement with the defendants verbally represented to the 
defendant William Call that he was a very larjge contractor and 
could obtain the materials for improvements a|t a low cost because 
of the large volume of his construction activities. 
23. The defendant William Call reasonably implied from the 
foregoing representations that the contractor would obtain the 
materials from his ov/n stock or his own warehouse and v/ould not be 
purchasing them from a third party. The defendant did not know \ 
that the plaintiff had supplied the subject Materials until after \ 
they had been supplied and the work complete^. I 
24. The plaintiff was not notified by the defendant or the ' 
or t>y 
contractor either verbally or in writing/ thei actions of either 
party that the defendant had represented to the ov/ner that he had 
not purchased these materials but had them iln his ov/n stock. 
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25. The defendants never contacted the plaintiff prior to 
thesupplying of materials nor did the plaintiff contact the 
defendants prior to the time that materials had been supplied to 
the property, although the plaintiff had knov/n the defendants were 
the recipients of the supplies and knew the address where such 
supplies were delivered. 
26. The defendants William G. Call and Gene S. Call failed to 
provide a bond for the improvements as required by §14-2-1 et seq. 
U.C.A. as amended. 
27. The value of the improvements exceeded $2f000.00. 
28. The contractor represented to the defendants that he 
would provide the materials and improvements for a total price of 
$1,800.00. Said amount was the agreed price between the 
defendants and their contractor Roy Gurule for the materials and 
labor supplied. 
29. Contractor further agreed with the defendants to accept a 
reupholstering of certain furniture as partial payment for the 
materials. This couch was later sold by the defendant to cover 
the costs of recoverying it. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff properly filed its Notice of Lien in 
conformance with the requirements of Utah Code §38-1-7 et seq. as 
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amended and properly gave notice by certified mail to the 
defendants within thirty days of the filing thereof. 
2. The authority of defendants contractor was verbally 
limited so as to preclude the defendant from obtaining materials 
from outside of his own warehouse. As a result of such verbal 
limitation, the contractor was without authority to act as the 
owner's agent in purchasing materials for improvements to 
defendants' property. 
3. By virtue of the defendants' lack of agency with the owner 
because of the verbal limitation on the agency of the contractor, 
the defendants are not entitled to foreclose their lien and are 
precluded from recovering attorney's fees in this action as 
related to the lien foreclosure. 
4. The reasonable value of all labor and materials delivered 
to the defendants' property and installed as improvements upon the 
property less all proper offsets and credits is the sum of 
$3f327.90 plus interest. 
5. The defendants failed to obtain a bond as required by the 
provisions of §14-2-1 et seq. U.C.A. as amended. The provisions 
of Paragraph 2.2 provide that any persons subject to the 
provisions of the chapter who shall fail to obtain a good and 
sufficient bond or to exhibit the same as herein required shall be 
personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or 
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performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of 
such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding however 
in any case the price agreed upon. 
6. The contract between the defendants and the contractor 
called for the contractor to supply labor and- materials in the sum 
of $1,800.00. The verbal contract between the defendants and the 
contractor called for the contractor's supply of labor and 
materials in the sum of $1800, although the contract between the 
contractor and his supplier called for a purchase price of $3,327. 
7. By failure of the defendants to obtain a bond for the U<3h 
improvements, they are liable/for the value of said improvements 
not to exceed the amount of the contract price between themselves 
and their contractor; to wit, $1,800.00 plus interest. 
8. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendants in the sum of $1,800.00, together with its costs and 
interest from the date the materials were supplied until date of 
judgment at 10% per annum and from the date of judgment until paid 
at 12% per annum^ _ /[\ f 
DATED this day of , '••VV^Wf 1987. 
<<>$&" m:^-
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Approved by: 
W. Call 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Sttf^ day of Qi/^^^^J 
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to John W. Call, Attorney for 
Defendants, Henriksen, Henriksen & Call, 320 South 500 East, 
S.L.C., UT 84102. 
^nC/Wto^hTl/isiZfiHetT^, 
